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Abstract
This paper aims to investigate the relationship between economic growth, institutional quality 
and financial development whitin a sample of middle-income countries. We generate three 
hypothesis on the potential relationships between those three dimensions by reviewing 
the existing literature and test them in the framework of a Panel Vector Autoregressive 
(PVAR) model. The main results, derived from the Impulse Response Function (IRF) analysis, 
are two-fold. First, we find a unidirectional positive relationship from economic growth to 
financial development. Second, institutional quality and economic growth are positively 
related but the causality direction depends on the nature of the institutional quality proxies. 
Legal institutional quality has an impact on economic growth while the latter causes an 
improvement in public sector institutional quality.
Keywords: economic growth, economic convergence, institutional quality, financial 
development.
JEL classification: O11, O16, O43.
Resumen
En este documento se aborda la relación entre el desarrollo económico, la calidad 
institucional y el desarrollo financiero en una muestra de países de renta media. Con este 
objetivo, hemos formulado tres hipótesis sobre las potenciales relaciones entre las citadas 
dimensiones a partir de una revisión de la literatura existente y las hemos comprobado 
en el marco de un modelo de panel de Vectores Autorregresivos (PVAR). Los principales 
resultados, derivados del análisis de las funciones impulso-respuesta, son dos. Primero, 
encontramos una relación positiva y unidireccional de crecimiento económico a desarrollo 
financiero. Segundo, constatamos una correlación positiva entre calidad institucional y 
crecimiento económico, si bien la dirección de causalidad parece depender de la naturaleza 
del proxy que usamos para medir la calidad de las instituciones. En este sentido, la calidad 
institucional del sistema jurídico tiene un impacto sobre el crecimiento económico, mientras 
que este último conlleva una mejora de la calidad institucional del sector público.
Palabras clave: crecimiento económico, convergencia económica, calidad institucional, 
desarrollo financiero.
Códigos JEL: O11, O16, O43.
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1 Introduction
Development is a multidimensional and non-linear process product of the interaction between institu-
tional, social and economic aspects. It is a fact that it correlates strongly with economic growth, allowing
the differences in the level of development to be faithfully explained by differences in growth rates or GDP
per capita. Nonetheless, economic growth interacts with other dimensions of different nature shaping the
level of development of a country.
The quality of the institutional framework and the degree of development of the financial system are
two of the aspects that interact between them and with economic growth and contribute to explain why
some countries have higher living standards than others. Institutions are generally defined as the “con-
straints that human beings impose on themselves” and set the rules of the game in a society1. Moreover,
linked to the concept of institutions has emerged the notion of governance or institutional quality. The
World Bank (1992) defines it as “the manner to which power is exercised in the management of a coun-
try’s economic and social resources for development”. For its part, financial development is linked to the
concept of financial deepening which refers to the increase in the size or liquidity of the financial markets2.
From the last decades of the 20th century, institutions and financial development have come to the fore
as key aspects in the development process. Many developing countries embarked transformation of their
institutionally and deepened their financial systems following policy recommendations of international
organizations during this period3. These policy recommendations have been ground on the premise that
improving institutional quality via institutional reforms and deepening the financial systems would lead
automatically to higher rates of growth. Nonetheless, the relationship between institutional quality and
financial development with economic growth seems to be more complex and potentially endogenous.
In fact, these dimensions can interact in many ways. Sound institutions, particularly a legal framework
that can enforce financial contracts, support financial intermediation and reduce transaction costs, would
help to develop the financial sector. In turn, efficient institutions contribute positively to economic growth,
acting behind the classical determinants of growth (i.e. capital accumulation, technological development,
etc.) but could be also the result of society’s demands in the face of a flourishing economic scenario. For
its part, deep and efficient financial systems can boost growth by easing the saving-investment process
but it can also get developed driven by the demands of economic agents for a wider variety of financing
instruments generated by improved economic conditions.
1North (1990).
2Sahay et al. (2015)
3The need to deepen financial systems was a central recommendation of international organizations in the 1980s, being an
example of it the 1989 World Development Report by the World Bank. In the 1990s, the so-called Second-Generation Reforms
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put a particular emphasis on institutional reforms for promoting economic growth.
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In this work we aim at exploring the potential relationships betwee those three dimensions by taki g
i to account the different causality linkages exposed i the literature. From the revision of the existing
vidence we draw some possibl explanations which help us to construct our empirical m del. I p rticu-
lar, we develop three hypothesis on the exogeneity of the studied dimensions that we will test on this work:
1) Institutional quality → Financial development → Economic growth.
2) Instituti quality → Economic growth → Financial development.
3) Economic growth → Institutional quality → Financial development.
We test the hypothesis within a sample of 50 middle-income countries (MICs). The focus on that
group of countries responds to various reasons. First, MICs present a high variability, with successful
cases of convergence during our covered period while others remained stagnated. In fact, recent economic
literature has point out the prevalence of growth slow-downs in a vast group of MICs, even claiming the
existence of a “middle-income trap”4, at which has followed an extensive literature on potential growth
determinants on those countries5. Second, while a major part of literature on the relation between finan-
cial development, institutions and growth has tested it empirically within a pool of developed countries or
samples of both developed and developing countries together6, there is some evidence of differential effect
depending on the level of development. In this sense, the focus of our work on MICs could offer a novel
contribution and shed some new light on the growth literature on middle-income. Third, MICs usually
account for developing financial systems and some kind of formally established institutional framework,
unlike many low-income countries, which allows these dimensions to be better evaluated in the relation-
ship between them and with economic growth.
In summary, we explore the direction of causality between economic growth, some proxies of institu-
tional quality and some proxies of financial development within a sample of middle-income countries for
the period 1970-2010. Unlike previous research, we tackle the relation of those three dimensions altogether
and test three hypothesis developed through the review of the existing empirical evidence. The empirical
tool that we employ, a panel vector autoregressive model, allow us to treat the variables as potentially
endogenous and test the hypothesis via the Cholesky ordering. The next section gives an overview of
the related literature, describing the different directions of causality proposed between the dimensions.
Section 3 describes the data and the model specification. Sector 4 presents the results. Sector 5 includes
a regional analysis. Finally, Section 6 exposes the conclusions and some policy implications.
4Gill and Kharas, 2007; Aiyar et al, 2013; Eichengreen, Park and Shin, 2013.
5Izquierdo et al, 2016; Melguizo et al, 2017.
6Demetriades and Law, 2006; Ahlin and Pang, 2008; Compton and Giedeman, 2010.
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In this work we aim at exploring the potential relationships between those three dimensions by taking
into account the different causality linkages exposed in the literature. From the revision of the existing
evidence we draw some possible explanations which help us to construct our empirical model. In particu-
lar, we develop three hypothesis on the exogeneity of the studied dimensions that we will test on this work:
1) Institutional quality → Financial development → Economic growth.
2) Institution quality → Economic growth → Financial development.
3) Economic growth → Institutional quality → Financial development.
We test the hypothesis within a sample of 50 middle-income countries (MICs). The focus on that
group of countries responds to various reasons. First, MICs present a high variability, with successful
cases of convergence during our covered period while others remained stagnated. In fact, recent economic
literature has point out the prevalence of growth slow-downs in a vast group of MICs, even claiming the
existence of a “middle-income trap”4, at which has followed an extensive literature on potential growth
determinants on those countries5. Second, while a major part of literature on the relation between finan-
cial development, institutions and growth has tested it empirically within a pool of developed countries or
samples of both developed and developing countries together6, there is some evidence of differential effect
depending on the level of development. In this sense, the focus of our work on MICs could offer a novel
contribution and shed some new light on the growth literature on middle-income. Third, MICs usually
account for developing financial systems and some kind of formally established institutional framework,
unlike many low-income countries, which allows these dimensions to be better evaluated in the relation-
ship between them and with economic growth.
In summary, we explore the direction of causality between economic growth, some proxies of institu-
tional quality and some proxies of financial development within a sample of middle-income countries for
the period 1970-2010. Unlike previous research, we tackle the relation of those three dimensions altogether
and test three hypothesis developed through the review of the existing empirical evidence. The empirical
tool that we employ, a panel vector autoregressive model, allow us to treat the variables as potentially
endogenous and test the hypothesis via the Cholesky ordering. The next section gives an overview of
the related literature, describing the different directions of causality proposed between the dimensions.
Section 3 describes the data and the model specification. Sector 4 presents the results. Sector 5 includes
a regional analysis. Finally, Section 6 exposes the conclusions and some policy implications.
4Gill and Kharas, 2007; Aiyar et al, 2013; Eichengreen, Park and Shin, 2013.
5Izquierdo et al, 2016; Melguizo et al, 2017.
6Demetriades and Law, 2006; Ahlin and Pang, 2008; Compton and Giedeman, 2010.
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2 Literature view
An extensive literature exists on the causal relationship between institutional quality, financial develop-
ment and economic growth. However, most part of it have concentrated in analyzing the link between
two of the dimensions separately and the direction of causality remains a point of discussion as empirical
evidence has yielded mixed results.
The emergence of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), and particularly North’s (1990) work,
placed the role of institutions at the center of research on the ultimate determinants of economic growth.
In contrast to those authors who pointed to geographical or demographic factors as the ultimate causes
of growth, the NIE focused on the role that the institutional framework plays for explaining economic
performance. From this stream, good institutions able to ensure contract enforcement and the security
of property rights, and proving checks against potential expropriation by the government or other power
groups, were highlighted as the ideal to reach by developing countries so to make them able to promote
sustainable growth. Since then, the study of this relationship has been one of the most discussed topics
in the economic literature of the last decades7. An extensive empirical literature that has modeled a re-
lationship from institutional variables to economic growth has contributed to generate a broad consensus
that a good institutional framework causes economic growth8.
On the contrary, we find a group of authors who question the causal relationship between institu-
tional quality and economic growth, especially emphasizing its potentially endogenous nature. Some
traces of this position can already be found in Lipset (1959), who hypothesized that prosperity stimulates
democracy, but it was not until the end of the 20th century that this proposition started to capture
more attention. Theoretically, proponents of that position argue that economic development creates
greater demand for quality institutions while enables countries to afford them. From a historical perspec-
tive, Chang (2011) points out that today’s developed countries acquired “good institutions” (democracy,
modern bureaucracy, property rights) after being rich, not before. Moreover, some authors add that
institutions’ form and functioning are dependent on the conditions under which they are created and
developed9. The empirical literature that has tested this relationship had to struggle with the potential
endogeneity between economic and institutional quality. Among the first works that consider the poten-
tial endogenous character of the dimensions is the one by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). In
their work, they used the rates of mortality among colonial settlers during colonial time as an instru-
ment for institutional quality10. More recent studies such as the ones by Chong and Calderon (2000)
and Glaeser et al (2004) also tried to disentangle that relationship and found evidence of bi-directionality.
7Ugur (2010) and Lee and Lloyd (2016) can provide a comprehensive literature review of this topic.
8Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003), and many others.
9Pzeworski (2004).
10The use of instrumental variables became very popular since then. Pande and Udry (2005) compile a list of instruments
used in the literature.
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tive, Chang (2011) points out that today’s developed countries acquired “good institutions” (democracy,
modern bureaucracy, property rights) after being rich, not before. Moreover, some authors add that
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Financial development has traditionally been considered to play a central role for economic perfor-
mance. It is a fact that those countries accounting for the most developed financial systems have also
the highest per capita income. The theoretical roots of the relationship between financial development
and growth can be traced back to the work of Schumpeter (1912), who argues that financial intermedi-
aries are key agents in the process of technological innovation, mobilizing household savings to innovative
companies and thus boosting growth. After Schumpeter, a vast strand of economists supported his ideas
a modelled a positive causal relation from financial development to economic growth11. A contrary view
was first postulated by Robinson (1952) who argued that demand for financial services is simply a conse-
quence of economic growth. From this view, the emerging of financial services responds to new economic
and institutional scenarios and further demands of economic agents generated from improved economic
conditions12. Lewis (1955) also supported Robinson view postulating financial development follows real
economic growth and serves as a mean for risk reduction and liquidity acquisition which eventually feeds
back economic growth.
Patrick (1966) adds to the question of causality another dimension postulating that the stage of de-
velopment of the country could shape the relation between financial development and economic growth.
He argues that this relation is not linear and changes within the development process13. In an early
stage of development, the relation would work from finance to growth while in a more advanced stage the
opposite would prevails14 His theory poses a particularly intriguing scenario for middle-income countries
that are halfway between underdeveloped and advanced economies.
The link between institutional quality and financial development seems to be the most well-established
in the literature. Evidence suggests that the institutional framework lays the ground for financial devel-
opment, whose success depends on the quality of the rules of the institutional game15. The idea behind
is that, given the intertemporal character of financial transactions, a financial system can only thrive in
an environment with sound institutions (Beck, 2016). With regards to the kind of institutions that are
best for promoting financial development, there has been produced an extensive literature that identify
the legal ones as the most important16.
11Mckinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and King and Levine (1993).
12Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Zang and Kim (2007) support empirically this hypothesis.
13This theory would contribute to explain why some authors such as Eichengreen et al (2017) or Ben Naceur et al (2017) find
no relation between financial development and economic growth when modelling it linearly.
14From an empirical approach, Calderon and Liu (2002), Samargandi et al (2015) and Ben Naceur et al (2017) find evidence
supporting Patrick’s view.
15La Porta et al. (1998), Levine (2003), Beck and Levine (2004).
16Beck (2016) offers a recent literature survey on the topic, and highlights the relevance of specific legal measures like “[. . . ]
the rights of secured and unsecured creditors, the efficiency of credit registries and bureaus, the quality of court systems and the
efficiency of contract enforcement, the existence and quality of collateral registries and accounting standards” (p. 17).
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stage of development, the relation would work from finance to growth while in a more advanced stage the
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that are halfway between underdeveloped and advanced economies.
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in the literature. Evidence suggests that the institutional framework lays the ground for financial devel-
opment, whose success depends on the quality of the rules of the institutional game15. The idea behind
is that, given the intertemporal character of financial transactions, a financial system can only thrive in
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In this work, we consider all the previous mentioned relations exposed in the literature but follow
a different approach since we analyze the three dimensions altogether and without assuming a priori
causalities17. In this way we seek to gain a broader perspective on how the three dimensions interact
with each other which could provide novel evidence on the subject. Moreover, this broader coverage could
be particularly useful for policy formulation.
3 Empiri al ethodolog
Data
Our dataset comprises yearly data for fifty MICs for the period 1970-2010. To build the sample of MICs
we follow a relative approach18. From this approach income status is usually defined as a fixed propor-
tion of mean or median individual or household income per capita of high-income economies or a specific
devel ped country, .e. the United States. We f llow the cr teria employed by W o (2012) and Ozturk
(2015), and define a country income status as a proportion of United States GDP per capita as follows:
countries with GDP p r capita below 20 per ent of the U.S. are classified as low-income, countries with
GDP per capita above 55 percent are classified as high-income and those between 20 and 55 percent of
U.S. are classified as middle-income.
This choice responds to various reasons. First, we avoid the problems and biases derived from a fixed
income classification. For instance, as Im and Rosenblatt (2013) mention: “[. . . ] The World Bank’s clas-
sification has operational implications in that the low income-middle income threshold determines access
to concessional IDA financing.” (p. 19). There is no consensus around the threshold definitions and the
most used one, the World Bank’s, might have important operational purposes. Second, a relative ap-
proach directly incorporate the concept of convergence which is on the fundamentals of the growth theory.
Data for constructing the GDP per capita relative to the US indicator and build our sample comes
from the Maddison Project Database 201319, that contains real GDP per capita data, in 1990 interna-
tional Geary–Khamis dollars (GK$), for 168 countries. For delimiting our sample we follow the next steps:
a) we construct the indicator of relative GDP per capita by following the previous mentioned definition;
17There exists a stream of literature that analyses the joint effect of financial development and institutions on growth, examining
if those dimensions are substitutes or complementary in their contributions to growth. Main works would be the ones by
Demetriades and Law (2006), Ahlin and Pang (2008) and Compton and Giedeman (2010). This approach would differ from our
as we do analyze all possible causality directions understanding that those dimensions are potentially endogenous.
18Income classifications can be done by following two different approaches: absolute or relative. An absolute approach consist
of establishing a fixed individual or household income per capita threshold for ranking country groups. In particular, most
studies usually employ the World Bank classification of countries in function of their GNI per capita. In that classification,
for the current 2019 fiscal year, low-income countries are defined as those with a GNI per capita of $995 or less in 2017; lower
middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $996 and $3,895; upper middle-income those with a GNI per
capita from $3,896 to $12,055; and high-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita of $12,056 or above.
19For more information see Bolt and van Zanden (2014).
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11Mckinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and King and Levine (1993).
12Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Zang and Kim (2007) support empirically this hypothesis.
13This theory would contribute to explain why some authors such as Eichengreen et al (2017) or Ben Naceur et al (2017) find
no relation between financial development and economic growth w en modelling it linearly.
14From an empirical approach, Calderon and Liu (2002), Samargandi et al (2015) and Ben Naceur et al (2017) find evidence
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In this work, we consider all the previous mentioned relations exposed in the literature but follow
a different approach since we analyze the three dimensions altogether and without assuming a priori
causalities17. In this way we seek to gain a broader perspective on how the three dimensions interact
with each other which could provide novel evidence on the subject. Moreover, this broader coverage could
be particularly useful for policy formulation.
3 Empirical methodology
Data
Our dataset comprises yearly data for fifty MICs for the period 1970-2010. To build the sample of MICs
we follow a relative approach18. From this approach income status is usually defined as a fixed propor-
tion of mean or median individual or household income per capita of high-income economies or a specific
developed country, i.e. the United States. We follow the criteria employed by Woo (2012) and Ozturk
(2015), and define a country income status as a proportion of United States GDP per capita as follows:
countries with GDP per capita below 20 percent of the U.S. are classified as low-income, countries with
GDP per capita above 55 percent are classified as high-income and those between 20 and 55 percent of
U.S. are classified as middle-income.
This choice responds to various reasons. First, we avoid the problems and biases derived from a fixed
income classification. For instance, as Im and Rosenblatt (2013) mention: “[. . . ] The World Bank’s clas-
sification has operational implications in that the low income-middle income threshold determines access
to concessional IDA financing.” (p. 19). There is no consensus around the threshold definitions and the
most used one, the World Bank’s, might have important operational purposes. Second, a relative ap-
proach directly incorporate the concept of convergence which is on the fundamentals of the growth theory.
Data for constructing the GDP per capita relative to the US indicator and build our sample comes
from the Maddison Project Database 201319, that contains real GDP per capita data, in 1990 interna-
tional Geary–Khamis dollars (GK$), for 168 countries. For delimiting our sample we follow the next steps:
a) we construct the indicator of relative GDP per capita by following the previous mentioned definition;
17There exists a stream of literature that analyses the joint effect of financial development and institutions on growth, examining
if those dimensions are substitutes or complementary in their contributions to growth. Main works would be the ones by
Demetriades and Law (2006), Ahlin and Pang (2008) and Compton and Giedeman (2010). This approach would differ from our
as we do analyze all possible causality directions understanding that those dimensions are potentially endogenous.
18Income classifications can be done by following two different approaches: absolute or relative. An absolute approach consist
of establishing a fixed individual or household income per capita threshold for ranking country groups. In particular, most
studies usually employ the World Bank classification of countries in function of their GNI per capita. In that classification,
for the current 2019 fiscal year, low-income countries are defined as those with a GNI per capita of $995 or less in 2017; lower
middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $996 and $3,895; upper middle-income those with a GNI per
capita from $3,896 to $12,055; and high-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita of $12,056 or above.
19For more information see Bolt and van Zanden (2014).
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b) we keep th se countri s that reached a middle-income status at some point of the p riod; c) we drop
countries with populati n of less than one milli n inhabitant the beginning of the period; d) we drop
countrie tr nsiting from low to middle-i come i 2000s. After hat, we end up with a sample that com-
pris s fifty countries: Arge ti a, Belarus, Brazil, Bulg ria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Est nia, Greece, Ho g K g, H ngary, I an, Iraq, Irela , Jam ica, Kazakhstan, L tvia, Libya,
Lithuania, M cedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Oma , Namibia, Pan ma, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Puerto Ri , Romania, Russi , Saudi Arab , Serbia, Si gapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, S uth Africa, South
K re , Spain, Syri , Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad a d Tobago, Turkey, Ukr ine, Uruguay and Venezuela.
GDP per capita rela ive to the US is not only the variable employed for building our sa ple but
repres nts one the main variable we exami e in this p per, as proxy of economic growth20. Therefore,
economic growth is u derstood here in terms of c nvergenc w th the advanced economies, i this a e
aking the U.S. as a benchmark21. Mathematically, this is can be represented a :
RelativeGDPit =
GDPit
GDPUS,t
Where RelativeGDPit represents the relative GDP per capita of each country i in the period t to the
U.S., GDPit corresponds to the GDP per ca ita of eac middle-income country i in the period t and
GDPUS,t corresponds to the GDP per capita of the U.S. for each period t.
MICs are a heterogeneous gr up that comp ise stories of convergence, stagnation and divergence
throughout the 1970-2010 period, as can be observed in Figure 1. Successful trajectories of convergence
are shown in the Panel A are mainly starred by the Asian Tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, South
Korea and Taiwan), some of the so-called Tiger Cub Economies (Malaysia and Thailand) and a bunch of
European countries (Estonia, Irelan a d Spain). The Asian Tigers show particularly rapid trajectories
of convergence, and reached high-income status at some point of the period. The cases of South Korea
and Taiwan are paradigmatic since they started from a low-income status in the seventies and manage
to transit to both middle and subsequently high-income within a couple of decades.
Panel B represents the opposite picture showing those countries that exhibit divergence trends during
the four covered decades. Within this group, we find mainly African and Middle-East countries (South
Africa, Libya, Syria, Namibia,. . . ), some European countries under the Soviet influence area (Romania,
Ukraine, Hungary,. . . ) and some Latin American (Argentina, Peru and Venezuela). They are worth to
mention the cases of Venezuela and Saudi Arabia that suffer from sharp declines of relative GDP per
capita within the period, even transiting from high-income to middle-income at some point.
20Throughout the paper we refer to economic growth, irrespective of the proxy variable we use to approach it.
21Although this is our preferred specification, we also tested the stability of our findings by using an absolute approach, in
this case GDP growth, and results still hold.
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Trajectories of stagnation, slowdown and ambiguous are shown in fugure at the bottom. Primarily
Latin American followed by European countries appear as the main exponents of this type of trends.
These trends seem to define MIC more than other country groups since they are more likely to be found
in MIC groups as accounted in the literature (Aiyar et al., 2013; Eichengreen, Park and Shin, 2013).
In fact, the idea of stagnation lies behind the fundamentals of the concept of “middle-income trap”,
introduced by Gill and Kharas (2007) to account for this growth phenomenon.
Figure 1: Growth patterns
Source: Own calculations based on Maddison Project Database 2013.
Notes: Line shows the median relative GDP per capita for each decade. The shaded area represents the income bracket in which a country is considered to
be middle-income.
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Financial development is the second dimension covered in this paper. Many countries of our sample
implemented a series of reform to deepen their financial systems within the period of analysis, particularly
from the eighties. This is why we employ measures that cover those aspects of financial development
related to the depth of the process. In particular, we use two bank-based indicators collected from the
Financial Development and Structure database of the World Bank. The first is the ratio of liquid liabili-
ties to GDP (%), also known as broad money or M3. This is a variable broadly used in the literature that
includes currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries
divided by GDP. It is a powerful measure of the broad coverage of financial intermediation as it includes
all financial and non-financial institutions. The second variable is the private credit by deposit money
banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%). This variable have been widely used in the literature
of finance and the relation between finance and growth22 and is usually cited as the most preferred fi-
nancial development indicator (Levine et al., 2000). It captures credit allocation in the financial system,
excluding the credit issued by the central bank and therefore reflect accurately the saving-investment
process in an economy as mentioned in Samargandi et al (2015).
For institutional quality we use two measures that capture two dimensions mentioned in the literature
on institutions: the public sector and the legal dimension. The public sector one is captured by the
indicator of quality of government of the International Country Risk Guide produced by the PRS Group.
It is a composite index rescaled 0-100 that comprises the mean value of three sub-indices: first assesses
the corruption within the political system, second evaluates law and order aspects and third measures
institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. A higher score represents a better government
quality. Although previous index partially captures aspects related to the legal side, we employ a sec-
ond index focused solely in that dimension of institutional quality so to analyse it separately. The legal
dimension have been pointed out in the literature as highly correlated with the development of financial
system23. A legal framework that can enforce financial contracts, support financial intermediation and
reduce transaction costs, helps to develop the financial sector. We capture it by using an index of legal
system and property rights from the Economic Freedom of the World Index. This is an index that ranges
0-100 and is composed by the following indicators: judicial independence (the judiciary is independent
and not subject to interference by the government or parties in dispute), impartial courts (a trusted legal
framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations),
protection of intellectual property, military interference in rule of law and the political process, and in-
tegrity of the legal system. It contains data every five years from 1970 to 2000 and from that date it has
annual data. We have carried out a quadratic interpolation of the data between 1970 and 2000. Higher
scores in this index are synonyms of holding a stronger legal framework.
22King and Levine (1993), Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Levine et al. (2000).
23Beck (2016).
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It is worth noting that we are aware that these two institutional quality variables suffer from some
problems that the literature has exposed. First, we are using composite index variables that could be
capturing an important component of subjectivity since the choice of components as well as weights
are discretional in most cases. Second, the sample selection, middle-income countries across the period
1970-2010, imposes significant restrictions to the data we can use. Nevertheless, by tackling two different
dimensions of institutional quality (public sector and legal), we can explore if distinctive features may
account for differential relations with growth and financial development.
Figure 2: Relationship between endogenous variables
Source: Own elaboration.
Scatter plots of the variables are shown in Figure 2. We find the expected positive relations of
all variables in line with the literature: economic growth correlates positively with both financial and
institutional variables which in turns correlate positively between them. However, the relations show
weak in most cases, reaching a R2 higher than 0.30 in only two cases: liquid liabilities and relative GDP
and, quality of government and relative GDP.
10
It is worth noting tha we are aware that these two institutional quality variables suffer from some
problems that the literature has exposed. First, we are using composite index variables that could be
capturing an important component of subjectivity since the choice of components as well as weights
are discretional in most cases. Second, the sample selection, middle-income countries across the period
1970-2010, imposes significant restrictions to the data we can use. Nevertheless, by tackling two different
dimensions of institutional quality (public sector and legal), we can explore if distinctive features may
account for differential relations with growth and financial development.
Figure 2: Relationship between endogenous variables
Source: Own elaboration.
Scatter plots of the variables are shown in Figure 2. We find the expected positive relations of
all variables in line with the literature: economic growth correlates positively with both financial and
institutional variables which in turns correlate positively between them. However, the relations show
weak in most cases, reaching a R2 higher than 0.30 in only two cases: liquid liabilities and relative GDP
and, quality of government and relative GDP.
10
It is worth noting that we are aware that these two institutional quality variables suffer from some
problems that the literature has exposed. First, we are using composite index variables that could be
capturing an important component of subjectivity since the choice of components as well as weights
are discretional in most cases. Second, the sample selection, middle-income countries across the period
1970-2010, imposes significant restrictions to the data we can use. Nevertheless, by tackling two different
dimensions of institutional quality (public sector and legal), we can explore if distinctive features may
account for differential relations with growth and financial development.
Figure 2: Relationship between endogenous variables
Source: Own elaboration.
Scatter plots of the variables are shown in Figure 2. We find the expected positive relations of
all variables in line with the literature: economic growth correlates positively with both financial and
institutional variables which in turns correlate positively between them. However, the relations show
weak in most cases, reaching a R2 higher than 0.30 in only two cases: liquid liabilities and relative GDP
and, quality of government and relative GDP.
10
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1937
It is worth noting that we are aware that these two institutional quality variables suffer from some
problems that the literature has exposed. First, we are using composite index variables that could be
capturing an important component of subjectivity since the choice of components as well as weights
are discretional in most cases. Second, the sample selection, middle-income countries across the period
1970-2010, imposes significant restrictions to the data we can use. Nevertheless, by tackling two different
dimensions of institutional quality (public sector and legal), we can explore if distinctive features may
account for differential relations with growth and financial development.
Figure 2: Relationship between endogenous variables
Source: Own elaboration.
Scatter plots of the variables are shown in Figure 2. We find the expected positive relations of
all variables in line with the literature: economic growth correlates positively with both financial and
institutional variables which in turns correlate positively between them. However, the relations show
weak in most cases, reaching a R2 higher than 0.30 in only two cases: liquid liabilities and relative GDP
and, quality of government and relative GDP.
10
Model specification
To examine the relationship between economic growth, institutional quality and financial development,
we estimate a panel vector autoregressive model (PVAR), a methodology originally developed by Holtz-
Eakin et al (1988) as an extension of the traditional VAR methodology by Sims (1980). This methodology
has several advantages for approaching our topic: a) it exploits the panel structure of the data (i.e. tem-
poral and geographic variation), b) it allows to analyse the dynamic relationship between the variables
by including lags, and thus to test whether the potential effects are only short-term or last longer and,
c) it is specifically designed to consider the inverse causality issue, since all the variables included are
treated as potentially endogenous.
The base specification used in this paper has the general structure of a PVAR model, as follows:
Yit = A(L)Yi,t−1 +BXit + uit
Where Yit is the vector of our dependent/endogenous variables (relative GDP per capita, one of our
two institutional quality proxies and one of our two financial development proxies), A(l) are the ma-
trices of lagged coefficients, Xit is the vector of exogenous control variables (patents, public debt to
GDP, percentage of population with tertiary education and terms of trade index), and uit denotes the er-
ror term. The model comprises data for fifty economies (i) and 40 years covering the period 1970-2010 (t).
We develop four different model specifications derived from the combination of our two financial and
two institutional variables: 1) relative GDP per capita-liquid liabilities-quality of government, 2) relative
GDP per capita-liquid liabilities-legal and property rights, 3) relative GDP per capita-private credit-
quality of government and, 4) relative GDP per capita-private credit-legal and property rights.
We follow the usual steps that a PVAR analysis involves. The first step of the analysis is to look at the
properties of the variables in the specification. For this purpose, we perform four panel unit root tests:
one assuming a common unit root process (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002), and three that consider individual
processes: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Maddala and Wu, 1999; and
Choi, 2001) and Phillips and Perron (1988) test24. We perform each test with the variables in levels and
in first differences to decide how each variable enters in the PVAR model (Table 1). We find that the
relative GDP to U.S., the two financial variables, public debt to GDP, the percent of population with
tertiary education complete and the terms of trade index are integrated of order one, I(1), therefore we
introduce them in the models in first differences. The two institutional quality variables and the number
of patents are found to be I(0), therefore we include them in levels.
24For further information Pesaran (2012) surveys a significant selection of panel unit root tests and their interpretation within
the context of panel data.
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Table 1: Unit root tests
Levels 1st diff.
Variable LLC IPS ADF PP LLC IPS ADF PP
Indiv. intercept 0.096 0.509 0.082 0.990 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RELATIVE
GDP
Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.998 0.803 0.221 0.982 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None 1.000 - 0.235 0.270 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Indiv. intercept 0.994 1.000 0.985 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LIQUID LIAB. Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.010 0.104 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None - - - - - - - -
Indiv. intercept 1.000 1.000 0.097 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PRIVATE
CREDIT
Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.944 1.000 0.832 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None - - - - - - - -
Indiv. intercept 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
QUALITY OF
GOV.
Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.589 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None 0.003 - 0.960 0.904 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Indiv. intercept 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LEGAL Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.000 0.006 0.000 0.807 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None - - - - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Indiv. intercept 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PUBLIC DEBT Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.962 0.674 0.499 0.952 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None 0.914 - 0.472 0.728 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Indiv. intercept 0.832 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PATENTS Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None 0.382 - 0.109 0.003 - - - -
Indiv. intercept 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.158 0.003 0.917
EDUCATION Indiv. intercept
and trend
1.000 1.000 0.503 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
None 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 0.106 - 0.406 0.018
Indiv. intercept 0.045 0.253 0.314 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TERMS OF
TRADE
Indiv. intercept
and trend
0.029 0.252 0.053 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
None 0.568 - 0.990 0.853 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Note: The probabiliy to accept the null hypothesis of presence of an unit root is presented here.
The second step would be to choose the optimal lag order for the panel VAR specifications. If the
model includes few lags we could fail to capture the system’s dynamics, but if there are too many there
is a loss of degrees of freedom (Boubtane et al, 2013). For deciding the appropriate lag length, there are
many information criteria, like the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Bayesian criterion
(SC), and the Hannan-Quinn criterion. All of them address the trade-off between fit and loss of degrees
of freedom, so the best lag length will be the one that minimise this parameter. In our work, we will use
SC, which points to the use of two lags in the four specifications of the PVAR (Table 2).
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None 0.568 - 0.990 0.853 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
Note: The probabiliy to accept the null hypothesis of presence of an unit root is presented here.
The second step would be to choose the optimal lag order for the panel VAR specifications. If the
model includes few lags we could fail to capture the system’s dynamics, but if there are too many there
is a loss of degrees of freedom (Boubtane et al, 2013). For deciding the appropriate lag length, there are
many information criteria, like the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Bayesian criterion
(SC), and the Hannan-Quinn criterion. All of them address the trade-off between fit and loss of degrees
of freedom, so the best lag length will be the one that minimise this parameter. In our work, we will use
SC, which points to the use of two lags in the four specifications of the PVAR (Table 2).
12
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1937
Table 2: Lag order criterion - SC
Lag M1: RELATIVE GDP - M2: RELATIVE GDP - M3: RELATIVE GDP - M4: RELATIVE GDP -
LIQUID LIAB. - LIQUID LIAB. - PRIVATE CREDIT - PRIVATE CREDIT -
QUALITY OF GOV. LEGAL QUALITY OF GOV. LEGAL
0 -5.568587 -5.526474 -5.108124 -5.453489
1 -8.668596 -8.408272 -8.400635 -8.797629
2 -8.700104* -8.483680* -8.422790* -8.865070*
After the previous steps, we can estimate PVAR models. For interpreting a PVAR, the most common
is to compute impulse response functions (IRFs). They describe the response of an endogenous variable
to a shock in another variable in the system over time. The order in which each variable enters into the
IRF determines the results and should not be arbitrary. Granger causality tests or intuition and existing
economic theory about the relation between the variables can help us to establish the order (Cholesky
decomposition). In this paper we test the three main hypothesis extracted from the theoretical and
empirical existing evidence by setting three different orders in the Cholesky decomposition. This would
allow us to answer some of the main research questions of this work: a) how is the relationship between
economic growth, financial development and institutional quality, and b) what is the size of the impact,
if any, of each of the dimensions on the rest. Stability of results in IRFs when testing different Cholesky
orderings can be interpreted as a confirmation of one hypothesis in detriment of the others.
Finally, after computing IRFs we should check the stability condition of the estimated PVAR specifi-
cations. The resulting figure of eigenvalues confirms that the estimates are stable since all the eigenvalues
lie inside the unit circle (Figure 1 of the Annex). As a result, the estimated PVAR satisfies the stability
condition and we can compute reliable IRFs.
4 Main empirical results
Figure 3 and 4 depict the IRFs for our four model specifications. IRFs show the average responses of
endogenous variables to a positive exogenous shock of one standard deviation on another one. The dashed
lines represent the confidence bands of ±2 standard errors, therefore there is a significant impact only
when this interval lies above or below the zero line. For the sake of brevity, we report only the results for
one of the three possible Cholesky orderings: hypothesis 225. As we will see later, results remain quite
stable across the different orderings.
Panel A shows the results for the first model. We find significant responses to shocks in two cases: in
the relationship between institutional quality and economic growth, and between economic performance
and financial development. There is a small positive response of the quality of government index to a
25The rest are available upon request.
13
Table 2: Lag order criterion - SC
Lag M1: RELATIVE GDP - M2: RELATIVE GDP - M3: RELATIVE GDP - M4: RELATIVE GDP -
LIQUID LIAB. - LIQUID LIAB. - PRIVATE CREDIT - PRIVATE CREDIT -
QUALITY OF GOV. LEGAL QUALITY OF GOV. LEGAL
0 -5.568587 -5.526474 -5.108124 -5.453489
1 -8.668596 -8.408272 -8.400635 -8.797629
2 -8.700104* -8.483680* -8.422790* -8.865070*
After the previous steps, we can estimat PVAR models. For interpreting a PVAR, the m st common
is to compute impulse response functions (IRFs). They de cribe the response of an endogenous variable
to a shock in another variable in the sy tem over time. The order in which each variable enters in o the
IRF determines the results and should not be arbitrary. Granger c usality tes s or intuition and existing
eco omic theory about the relation b tween the variables can help us to establish the ord r ( l
decomposition). In this paper we test the three main hypothesis extracted from the theoretical and
empirical existing evidence by setting three different orders in the Cholesky decomposition. This would
allow us to nswer some of the main research ques ion of this work: a) how is the relationship between
economic growth, fi ancial dev lopment and institu ional quality, and b) what is the size of the impact,
if any, of each of the dimensions on the rest. Stability of results in IRFs when testing diff rent Cholesk
orderings can be interpreted as a confirmation of one hypothesis in detriment of the others.
Finally, after computing IRFs we should check the stability condition of the estimated PVAR specifi-
cations. The resulting figure of eigenvalues confirms that the estimates are stable since all the eigenvalues
lie inside the unit circle (Figure 1 of the Annex). As a result, the estimated PVAR satisfies the stability
condition and we can compute reliable IRFs.
4 Main empirical results
Figure 3 and 4 depict the IRFs for our four model specifications. IRFs show the average responses of
endogenous variables to a positive exogenous shock of one standard deviation on another one. The dashed
lines represent the confidence bands of ±2 standard errors, therefore there i a significa t impact only
when this interval lies above or below the zero line. For the sake of brevity, we report only the esults for
o e of the thre possible Cholesky orderings: hypothesi 225. As we will see later, r sults remain quite
stable across the different orderings.
Panel A shows the results for the first model. We find significant responses to shocks in two cases: in
the relationship between institutional quality and economic growth, and between economic performance
and financial development. There is a small positive response of the quality of government index to a
25The rest are available upon request.
13
shock on relative GDP. The effect is not very strong (around 0.01% at its peak) and lasts for 3-4 years,
starting in t+3 after the shock. Much more significant is the relationship between the relative GDP and
the financial variable: a positive shock in ec nomic performa ce triggers a positive response in the liquid
liabilities to GDP. This effect is short-lived. It starts in year t+2, reaches a peak of almost 0.2% and
then disappears in year t+4. Th impact in the first y ar is negativ b t not significant, and it can be
explained due to the relative nature of our financial development variable (it is a ratio to GDP) and how
it responds to an economic growth shock (it cannot react in only one year). In both cases the causality
direction is one sided, since no effect is found from a shock on quality of government or liquid liabilities
to relative GDP.
Panel B, which depicts the results of the second model, points to a different conclusion regarding the
first relationship mentioned above but supports the finding of the second one. In this model, we find a
significant positive response of economic growth to a shock on the legal and property rights index, just
the opposite causality direction than before. Here the size of the impact is smaller (only 0.002%), it
starts in t+3 and remains significant for the three following years. With regards to the relation between
economic growth and financial development, the significant effect goes again from relative GDP to liquid
liabilities to GDP. The sign, size and temporal horizon of the impact remains very similar to the first
model. Again, these are the only significant responses to shocks that IRFs reveal.
Panels C and D of Figure 4 display the results for the third and fourth models, where a different
indicator of financial development is used: private credit to GDP. The analysis of IRFs points to support
previous findings: the causality direction goes from economic growth to the institutional variable in the
case of the quality of government index, and the opposite works for the legal and property rights index;
also there are only significant effects from relative GDP to private credit to GDP and not the other way
around. Responses have a similar size and pattern to the ones in the first and second models, being
the effect of economic growth on the financial variable slightly higher (around 0.03%) and lasting one
additional year. A novelty appears in the fourth model: there is a positive response of the financial
variable to a shock in the legal and property rights index of about 0.01% in years t+3 and t+4.
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These results remain in general stable across our three different hypothesis. Table 3 shows the paired
relationships among the dimensions, and the sign of the effects when they are significant. The afore-
mentioned causality direction from relative GDP to both financial development proxies shows in all the
cases, with similar size and temporal pattern. Regarding the institutional variables, their relationships
with economic performance and financial development remain regardless the Cholesky ordering, with the
exception of the third hypothesis for the quality of government index.
Table 3: Summary of IRFs
H1: INS → FD → GDP H2: INS → GDP → FD H3: GDP → INS → FD
Relative GDP → Liquid liab. + + +
Relative GDP → Private credit + + +
Liquid liab. → Relative GDP
Private credit → Relative GDP
Relative GDP → Gov. quality + +
Relative GDP → Legal
Gov. quality → Relative GDP
Gov. quality → Liquid liab.
Gov. quality → Private credit
Legal → Relative GDP + + +
Legal → Liquid liab. +
Legal → Private credit + + +
In summary, the IRFs analysis points to two main findings: a) there is a significant, strong and positive
response of financial development variables to shocks on relative GDP that does not work the other way
around, and b) there is a relationship between institutional quality and economic performance, but
the causality direction depends on the nature of institutional quality proxies: legal institutional quality
precede economic growth, while the latter causes an improvement in the public sector one. Therefore,
these results aim to support not one but two of our hypothesis: hypothesis 2 (Institutional quality →
Economic growth→ Financial development) when the institutional quality proxy is the legal and property
rights index, and hypothesis 3 (Economic growth → Institutional quality → Financial development) in
the case of the quality of government index.
Discussion of results
From the empirical results we can draw a potential explanation of the mechanisms that govern the re-
lationship between the three studied dimensions: the institutional framework of a country, particularly
the functioning of the legal system, seems in the fundamentals of economic growth. The means by which
the legal framework affect economic growth are multiple. The protection of property rights contributes
to foster investment and so facilitate innovation, and an independent judicial system helps reduce cor-
ruption and bribery practices, supporting agents’ confidence on the security of transactions. Moreover,
a well-established legal framework sets the ground for the development of the financial system by ensur-
ing the enforcement of financial contracts, supporting financial intermediation and reducing transaction
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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costs as mentioned in Beck (2016). An expansive growth trajectory impact positively the development
of the financial system due to increasing demand for financial services. New intermediaries, markets
and services emerge contributing to deeper financial development. This buoyant economic scenario also
generates demands for new and better institutions which translates into an enhancement of institutional
quality. Reduced or eliminated corruption and bribery, eased rules for establishing new business, and
simplified bureaucratic processes are some of the aspects behind improved institutional quality26.
With regards to how our results are linked to the existing literature, the relationship between financial
development and economic growth, and between financial development and institutional quality appears
to be unidirectional in both cases. With respect to the first, our results are in line with the authors that
postulate a positive relation from economic growth to financial development (Robinson, 1952; Lewis,
1955). In the second case, we can only add one more piece of evidence to the already existing that places
institutional quality as a driver of financial development (La Porta et al, 1998; Levine, 2003; among
others.).
The link between institutional quality and economic growth is more puzzling as our results cannot
support only one causality direction. In general, our results are in line with the main strand of the litera-
ture which states that institutional framework precede growth, but we also find evidence of the opposite.
In this sense, we think that the different nature of the two indexes that we use, which are likely to be
measuring different aspects of institutional quality, could explain why each of them points to a different
conclusion.
On the one hand, the quality of government index aims at assessing how well the public administra-
tions functions. It is what Ju¨tting (2003) classifies as a “performance indicator” variable27. On the other
hand, the legal and property rights index provides information on the legal side of institutions, includ-
ing on judicial courts, lawyer independence, and the existing legal framework. It is an indicator of the
“attributes” of institutions, following Ju¨tting (2003) classification. In a nutshell, this variable measures
the setup in which economic activity takes place while the former captures the outcome of that setup.
Thus, we would expect the legal and property rights index to be more exogenous to economic growth
than the quality of government one. In addition, if this reasoning is right, we would also find more easily
a positive causal relationship going from the legal system index to our financial development variables,
than in the case of the quality of government index. As we presented before, this is exactly what we obtain.
26It is worth noting that there could be more mechanisms involved in the relationship between the three considered dimensions
and we are aware of their endogenous nature. We present here a plausible explanation of our findings for a sample of middle-
income countries.
27Glaeser et al (2004), when discussing different institutional measures, says the following about the ICRG data (the source
of the quality of government index): “It is plain that these measures reflect what actually happened in a country rather than
some permanent rules of the game” (pag. 9).
18
costs as mentioned in Beck (2016). An expansive growth trajectory impact positively the development
of the financial system due to increasing demand for financial services. New intermediaries, markets
and services emerge contributing to deeper financial development. This buoyant economic scenario also
generates demands for new and better institutions which translates into an enhancement of institutional
quality. Reduced or eliminated corruption and bribery, eased rules for establishing new business, and
simplified bureaucratic processes are some of the aspects behind improved institutional quality26.
With regards to how our results are linked to the existing literature, the relationship between financial
development and economic growth, and between financial development and institutional quality appears
to be unidirectional in both cases. With respect to the first, our results are in line with the authors that
postulate a positive relation from economic growth to financial development (Robinson, 1952; Lewis,
1955). In the second case, we can only add one more piece of evidence to the already existing that places
institutional quality as a driver of financial development (La Porta et al, 1998; Levine, 2003; among
others.).
The link between institutional quality and economic growth is more puzzling as our results cannot
support only one causality direction. In general, our results are in line with the main strand of the litera-
ture which states that institutional framework precede growth, but we also find evidence of the opposite.
In this sense, we think that the different nature of the two indexes that we use, which are likely to be
measuring different aspects of institutional quality, could explain why each of them points to a different
conclusion.
On the one hand, the quality of government index aims at assessing how well the public administra-
tions functions. It is what Ju¨tting (2003) classifies as a “performance indicator” variable27. On the other
hand, the legal and property rights index provides information on the legal side of institutions, includ-
ing on judicial courts, lawyer independence, and the existing legal framework. It is an indicator of the
“attributes” of institutions, following Ju¨tting (2003) classification. In a nutshell, this variable measures
the setup in which economic activity takes place while the former captures the outcome of that setup.
Thus, we would expect the legal and property rights index to be more exogenous to economic growth
than the quality of government one. In addition, if this reasoning is right, we would also find more easily
a positive causal relationship going from the legal system index to our financial development variables,
than in the case of the quality of government index. As we presented before, this is exactly what we obtain.
26It is worth noting that there could be more mechanisms involved in the relationship between the three considered dimensions
and we are aware of their endogenous nature. We present here a plausible explanation of our findings for a sample of middle-
income countries.
27Glaeser et al (2004), when discussing different institutional measures, says the following about the ICRG data (the source
of the quality of government index): “It is plain that these measures reflect what actually happened in a country rather than
some permanent rules of the game” (pag. 9).
18
These results remain in general stable across our three different hypothesis. Table 3 shows the paired
relationships among he mensions, and the sign of the effects when they are significant. The afore-
mentioned causality direction from relative GDP to both financial development proxies shows in all the
cases, with similar size and temporal pattern. Regarding the institutional variables, their relationships
with economic performance and financial development remain regardless the Cholesky ordering, with the
exception of the third hypothesis for the quality of government index.
Table 3: Summary of IRFs
H1: INS → FD → GDP H2: INS → GDP → FD H3: GDP → INS → FD
Relative GDP → Liquid liab. + + +
Relative GDP → Private credit + + +
Liquid liab. → Relative GDP
Private credit → Relative GDP
Relative GDP → Gov. quality + +
Relative GDP → Legal
Gov. quality → Relative GDP
Gov. quality → Liquid liab.
Gov. quality → Private credit
Legal → Relative GDP + + +
Legal → Liquid liab. +
Legal → Private credit + + +
In summary, the IRFs analysis points to two main findings: a) there is a significant, strong and positive
response of financial development variables to shocks on relative GDP that does not work the other way
around, and b) there is a relationship between institutional quality and economic performance, but
the causality direction depends on the nature of institutional quality proxies: legal institutional quality
precede economic growth, while the latter causes an improvement in the public sector one. Therefore,
these results aim to support not one but two of our hypothesis: hypothesis 2 (Institutional quality →
Economic growth→ Financial development) when the institutional quality proxy is the legal and property
rights index, and hypothesis 3 (Economic growth → Institutional quality → Financial development) in
the case of the quality of government index.
Discussion of results
From the empirical results we can draw a potential explanation of the mechanisms that govern the re-
lationship between the three studied dimensions: the institutional framework of a country, particularly
the functioning of the legal system, seems in the fundamentals of economic growth. The means by which
the legal framework affect economic growth are multiple. The protection of property rights contributes
to foster investment and so facilitate innovation, and an independent judicial system helps reduce cor-
ruption and bribery practices, supporting agents’ confidence on the security of transactions. Moreover,
a well-established legal framework sets the ground for the development of the financial system by ensur-
ing the enforcement of financial contracts, supporting financial intermediation and reducing transaction
17
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1937
costs as mentioned in Beck (2016). An expansive growth trajectory impact positively the development
of the financial system due to increasing demand for financial services. New intermediaries, markets
and services emerge contributing to deeper financial development. This buoyant economic scenario also
generates demands for new and better institutions which translates into an enhancement of institutional
quality. Reduced or eliminated corruption and bribery, eased rules for establishing new business, and
simplified bureaucratic processes are some of the aspects behind improved institutional quality26.
With regards to how our results are linked to the existing literature, the relationship between financial
development and economic growth, and between financial development and institutional quality appears
to be unidirectional in both cases. With respect to the first, our results are in line with the authors that
postulate a positive relation from economic growth to financial development (Robinson, 1952; Lewis,
1955). In the second case, we can only add one more piece of evidence to the already existing that places
institutional quality as a driver of financial development (La Porta et al, 1998; Levine, 2003; among
others.).
The link between institutional quality and economic growth is more puzzling as our results cannot
support only one causality direction. In general, our results are in line with the main strand of the litera-
ture which states that institutional framework precede growth, but we also find evidence of the opposite.
In this sense, we think that the different nature of the two indexes that we use, which are likely to be
measuring different aspects of institutional quality, could explain why each of them points to a different
conclusion.
On the one hand, the quality of government index aims at assessing how well the public administra-
tions functions. It is what Ju¨tting (2003) classifies as a “performance indicator” variable27. On the other
hand, the legal and property rights index provides information on the legal side of institutions, includ-
ing on judicial courts, lawyer independence, and the existing legal framework. It is an indicator of the
“attributes” of institutions, following Ju¨tting (2003) classification. In a nutshell, this variable measures
the setup in which economic activity takes place while the former captures the outcome of that setup.
Thus, we would expect the legal and property rights index to be more exogenous to economic growth
than the quality of government one. In addition, if this reasoning is right, we would also find more easily
a positive causal relationship going from the legal system index to our financial development variables,
than in the case of the quality of government index. As we presented before, this is exactly what we obtain.
26It is worth noting that there could be more mechanisms involved in the relationship between the three considered dimensions
and we are aware of their endogenous nature. We present here a plausible explanation of our findings for a sample of middle-
income countries.
27Glaeser et al (2004), when discussing different institutional measures, says the following about the ICRG data (the source
of the quality of government index): “It is plain that these measures reflect what actually happened in a country rather than
some permanent rules of the game” (pag. 9).
18
costs as mentioned in B ck (2016). An expansive growth trajectory impact positiv ly the development
of the financial system due o increasing demand for financial services. New interm diaries, markets
and services emerge contributin o deeper financial development. This buoyant eco omic scenario also
generates demands for new and b tter institutions which rans ates into an enhanceme t of ins itutional
quality. Reduced or el minated corruption and bribery, eased rules for es ablishing new business, and
simplified bureaucratic processes are som of the aspects behind improved institutional quali y26.
With regards to how our results are linked to the existing literatu e, the r lationship between financ al
development and economic growth, and between financial development and institutional quality appears
o be unidirectional in both cases. With respect to the first, our results are in l n with the uthors that
postulate a positive relation from economic growth to financial development (Robinson, 1952; Lewis,
1955). In the second case, we can only add one more piece of evidence to the already existing that places
institutional quality as a driver of financial development (La Porta et al, 1998; Levine, 2003; among
others.).
The link between institutional quality and economic growth is more puzzling as our results cannot
support only one causality direction. In general, our results are in line with the main strand of the litera-
ture which states that institutional framework precede growth, but we also find evidence of the opposite.
In this sense, we think that the different nature of the two indexes that we use, which are likely to be
measuring different aspects of institutional quality, could explain why each of them points to a different
conclusion.
On the one hand, the quality of government index aims at assessing how well the public administra-
tions functions. It is what Ju¨tting (2003) classifies as a “performance indicator” variable27. On the other
hand, the legal and property rights index provides information on the legal side of institutions, includ-
ing on judicial courts, lawyer independence, and the existing legal framework. It is an indicator of the
“attributes” of institutions, following Ju¨tting (2003) classification. In a nutshell, this variable measures
the setup in which economic activity takes place while the former captures the outcome of that setup.
Thus, we would expect the legal and property rights index to be more exogenous to economic growth
than the quality of government one. In addition, if this reasoning is right, we would also find more easily
a positive causal relationship going from the legal system index to our financial development variables,
than in the case of the quality of government index. As we presented before, this is exactly what we obtain.
26It is worth noting that there could be more mechanisms involved in the relationship between the three considered dimensions
and we are aware of their endogenous nature. We present here a plausible explanation of our findings for a sample of middle-
income countries.
27Glaeser et al (2004), when discussing different institutional measures, says the following about the ICRG data (the source
of the quality of government index): “It is plain that these measures reflect what actually happened in a country rather than
some permanent rules of the game” (pag. 9).
18
costs as mentioned in Beck (2016). An ex a s v growth traj ctory impact positively the development
of the financial sys em due to incr as g dema d for fina cial services. New intermediar e , markets
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With reg rds to how ur re ults are linked to the existing literatur , the relationship between financ l
development and economic growth, and between financial developm nt and i stitutio al quality appears
to be unidir ctional in both cases. With respect t the first, our r sults are in line with the authors that
postulate posit ve relation from economic growth to financial development (Robinson, 1952; Lewis,
1955). In the second case, we can only add one more piece of evidence to the already existing that places
insti utional quality as a driver of fi ancial development (La Porta et al, 1998; Levine, 2003; among
others.).
The link between institutional quality and economic growth is more puzzling as our results cannot
support o ly on causality direction. In ge eral, our results are in line wi h the main strand of the litera-
ture which states th t ins itutional framework precede growth, but we also find evidence of he opposite.
In this sense, we think that the different nature of the two indexes that we use, which are likely to be
measuring different aspects of institutional quality, could explain why each of them points to a different
conclusion.
On the one hand, the quality of gov rnment index ai s at assessing how well the public admi istra
tions functions. It is wh t Ju¨tting (2003) lassifies as a “performance indicator” variable27. On the other
h nd, the legal and property rights index provides information on the legal side of institutions, includ-
ing on jud cial courts, lawyer independence, and the existing legal framework. It is an indicator of the
“attributes” of institutions, followi g Ju¨tting (2003) classification. In a nutshell, this variable measures
e setup in which econo ic activity t kes place w le the former captures the outcome of that setup.
Thus, we wo ld expect the le al and property rights index to be mo e exogenous to economic growth
the quality of government one. I addition, if this reasoni g is right, we would also find more eas ly
a positive causal relationship going from the legal system index to our financial development variables,
than in the case of the quality of government index. As we presented before, this is exactly what we obtain.
26It is worth noting that there could be more mechanisms involved in the relationship between the three considered dimensions
and we are aware of their endogenous nature. We present here a plausible explanation of our findings for a sample of middle-
income countries.
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One way to test this issue would be to analyse the causal relationship between the two institutional
quality proxies by usin a panel Grang r causality test. A variable is meant to Granger-cause nother if
we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the lags of the first one in the equation where the
other is the dependent variable are all equal to zero28. This is, if we find that legal institutional quality
precedes to public sector institutional quality, this could help understanding the differential relationship
of those two variables with economic growth. Results of Granger causality test are displayed in Table 4.
We observe a bidirectional relationship between the two institutional proxies, but the legal and property
rights index shows a stronger Granger-causality to the quality of government index than the other way
around, being the latter only significant at the 5% level. Given that, we find an additional piece of
evidence of the likely different nature of the two institutional quality proxies which points to the legal
index as more exogeneous than the public sector index. This would contribute to explain why in our
analysis we find a causal relationship from legal institutional quality to economic growth while public
sector institutional quality appears as a consequence of econo ic growth.
Table 4: Granger causality tests
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
Quality of Government does not Granger cause Legal 874 3.243 0.039
Legal does not Granger cause Quality of Government 47.624 0.000
In the next section, we test if the relationship between economic growth, institutional quality and
financial development remain stable when tested on different geographical subsamples of MIC. This
exercise could provide some interesting insights on how the relationship could be shaped by geographical,
cultural and structural factors that neighbour countries are likely to share.
5 Regional subsamples
MICs are a heterogeneous group that present a high variability in terms of their convergence trajectories
and show different levels of economic growth, institutional quality and financial development. Among
them, countries located geographically close are very likely to share characteristics. This is, neighbour
countries could have some similarities in the economic episodes they have experienced and share some
institutional and financial features. Moreover, the relationship between our three studied dimensions
could be non-linear. In this sense, most authors pointed to the level of development as the explanation
for non-linear results, particularly existing differences between developed and developing countries in the
28It is worth to mention that we are aware that the concept of Granger-causality is not equivalent to causation, and should
be understood as a test of “firstness” as noted by Dawson (2003).
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way that dimensions interact29. Although heterogeneity should be reduced by limiting our analysis to
MICs, nonlinearities could already exist. It is with this idea in mind that we split our sample of countries
in four different geographical regions: Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa and Middle East.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics by geographical area
RELATIVE GDP GOVERN. QUALITY LEGAL LIQUID LIAB. PRIVATE CREDIT
EUROPE
Median 32.2 63.9 62.8 42.1 35.6
Max. 80.9 94.4 91.8 167.7 237.6
Min. 9.2 22.2 13.6 6.9 1.1
Obs. 727 427 472 488 501
LATIN AMERICA
Median 26.4 50.0 50.0 29.9 23.7
Max. 71.0 77.8 72.6 86.2 97.3
Min. 11.9 19.4 9.8 4.1 4.8
Obs. 527 324 442 398 397
ASIA
Median 36.7 68.1 65.3 82.9 89.3
Max. 100.8 91.7 86.1 313.6 174.4
Min. 11.0 38.9 41.6 28.4 17.6
Obs. 246 135 246 182 183
AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST
Median 24.1 52.8 57.8 45.2 30.5
Max. 74.8 89.8 83.2 112.8 149.8
Min. 3.5 11.1 16.8 5.4 1.4
Obs. 363 209 187 241 239
Table 5 presents a summary of the main variables for each of the regions. Asian countries account for
the highest median values in every variable: relative per capita GDP (37%), institutional quality (more
than 65 points in both indices), and financial development (ratios bigger than 80% of the GDP). In terms
of economic convergence, they are followed by European economies (32%), the Latin America region
(26%), and finally Africa and Middle East countries, which exhibit the poorest economic performance
(24%). With regards to institutional quality, European countries appear again with the second best one
(around 60 points on average), followed by African and Middle Eastern countries and Latin America (56
and 50 points on average, respectively). As for financial development, Latin America shows the lowest
value, bellow 30% of the GDP on both indicators. Europe and Africa and Middle East would be at a
midway point between Asian and Latin American, with values between 30% and 45%, depending on the
variable.
For each of the regions we perform the same empirical analysis that we presented before. Figures
from 2 to 9 in the Appendix depict the results of the four models for each of the regions. Again, we only
29An extensive literature have studied a potential nonlinear relationship between financial development and growth, following
Patrick (1966) proposal. Regarding the one between institutional quality and growth, literature is more recent and still developing
but some authors such as Lee and Kim (2009), Chang (2011) and Law et al (2013) show evidence of the existence of nonlinearities.
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present the IRFs corresponding to the Cholesky ordering established in ypot esis 230.
From the analysis of the IRFs we can indicate that the results generally point in the same direction
as those obtained with the full sample: a positive and significant relationship that goes from economic
growth to financial development and from institutional quality to financial development. On the relation-
ship between institutional quality and relative GDP per capita results do not dispute the bidirectional
causality previously found and allow us to deepen the interpretation of the relationship through new
theoretical perspectives.
The positive response of the financial development proxies to a shock in relative GDP per capita shows
in every region, with the exception of Africa and Middle East, with similar temporal pattern and size.
The impact to relative GDP shocks on liquid liabilities is somewhat stronger in Latin America compared
to other regions, while Europe shows the biggest response of relative GDP shocks on the private credit.
In the Asian countries there is an initial negative and significant effect on the financial variables in year
t+1, due to the nature of financial development proxies as a ratio of GDP, but the expected positive sign
arises in the following years.
Europe appears as an interesting case since it is the only region which shows a bidirectional causality
between financial development and economic growth. A positive shock on liquid liabilities causes a posi-
tive response of relative per capita GDP of about 0.005% in year t+2, and from then it slowly decreases
until disappearing five years after. The effect of private credit on the economic growth proxy shows
weaker (reaching a size of 0.004%) and shorter (it lasts for 1-2 years). In general, the size of the responses
is smaller than the ones of financial development proxies to economic growth shocks, thus confirming the
later direction is most common and significant in MICs.
The relationship between institutional quality and economic development is difficult to find when
regional subsamples are examined. As we have seen in the full sample analysis, the size of the responses
to shocks between these two dimensions are small, therefore it is no easy to find significant relationships
when we reduce the number of observations. However, we get some interesting insights by carrying out
this exercise. The relation of causality that goes from the legal and property rights index to relative GDP
per capita normally does not appear in our estimations31. That could mean that the relationship is not
linked to any region in particular, but rather some countries from different parts of the world drive this
result. For its part, the effect of an improvement of the economic conditions on the quality of government
index only shows in the Asian region, pointing at the effect of those countries for the general findings
when the full sample is analysed. Moreover, the size of the response in Asian countries is bigger (around
30The rest of results are available upon request.
31Nonetheless, we need to indicate that we find it for the African and Middle-East region but only when setting the Cholesky
ordering that corresponds to the hypothesis 3.
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0.03% vs 0.01% in the peak) and lasts longer than the one for the whole sample.
The positive effect of relative GDP on quality of government index in Asia is quite interesting, because
allows us to interpret the relationship between economic development and institutional quality in new
ways. As mentioned previously, due to the fact that regions differ in their level of income, we could
observe some nonlinearities (or threshold effects) that govern the relationship between relative GDP
and the quality of government index. The idea behind would be that a certain institution can promote
growth in a country with a specific level of development, but maybe hampers it in another with a different
economic situation32. There exists a numerous group of authors who considered this issue33, and conclude
that the effect of institutions on growth has decreasing returns, i.e. the richer the country, the weaker
the relationship. This is something we can also deduct from our results: the fact that Asia is the most
developed region of our sample could explain the absence of causality from institutions to economic
growth and the existence of the opposite relation34. This finding would also give support to the idea
that higher levels of economic growth generate the necessary resources to create, reform and improve
institutions (Justesen, 2008).
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyzed the direction of causality between economic growth, institutional quality and
financial development within a sample of 50 middle-income countries for the period 1970-2000. From the
revision of existing evidence, we came up with three hypotheses on the relationship between these dimen-
sions. To test them we used a panel VAR methodology, which allowed us to disentangle the endogenous
relations between the studied dimensions and capture their dynamic nature. Each of the hypothesis was
tested by setting a corresponding Cholesky ordering on each model specification.
Our results point to two main findings: a) a significant, strong and positive response of financial
development to economic growth shocks that does not appear the other way around, and b) a significant
causal relationship between institutional quality and economic performance, whose direction depends on
the nature of institutional quality proxies: the legal institutional framework precedes economic growth,
while the latter causes an improvement in the quality of government. Thus, these results support not
one but two of our hypothesis: the one that works from institutional quality to economic growth, and
from the later to financial development (when the institutional variable is the legal and property rights
index), and the one that places economic growth as an engine for both institutional quality and financial
development (if we use the quality of government index).
32As an example, Chang (2011) pointed to the level of protection of intellectual property rights: they can bring benefit to a
rich country, but be harmful to a developing one.
33Chong and Caldero´n, 2000; Lee and Kim, 2009; Law et al, 2013.
34Moreover, the fact that Africa and Middle-East is the only region showing a significant effect from institutions to relative
per capita GDP, being the poorest group in our sample, would also contribute to support that idea.
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Based on the results we obtain, we can conclude that for middle-income countries growth is partly
driven by an improvement of their institutional framework, particularly of their legal and judicial system,
and several other factors beyond our analysis. We find no effect of financial development on economic
growth. In fact, the deepening of the financial system appears as a consequence rather than a cause of
growth in these economies. Economic development also helps to achieve a better institutional perfor-
mance, measured by the quality of government index. This bidirectional causality between growth and
institutional quality can be explained in more than one way, and here we exposed some possibilities: the
different nature of our institutional variables (one measure the framework in which the economy works
while the other captures the outcome of this development) and the existence of a threshold effect in this
relationship, this is, poorer countries tend to benefit more from improvements in institutions than rich
ones, where the relation could be the opposite.
The policy implications of our work are manifold. So to achieve a convergence trend and avoid the
“middle-income trap”, MICs should put the focus on multiple dimensions of the development process
including the quality of their legal system. The emphasis on deepening the financial system that was
a policy recommendation for many MICs from the nineties does not seem to have helped boosting eco-
nomic growth. In fact, financial development is found here to be a product of the later. Some features of
institutional quality, particularly the quality of government, appears also as a consequence of improved
economic conditions. Naturally, we should highlight certain particularities at the regional level: Asian
countries exhibit the strongest relationship from economic growth to quality of government and Europe
shows some effect from financial development to growth. However, in general economic growth appears
as a force that triggers both the deepening of financial systems and contributes to improve institutional
quality. Policies contributing to guarantee a sustainable path of growth could therefore be key for pro-
moting both financial development and institutional quality.
Further research by employing a more granular approach could help to better understand how the
relationships work. For instance, the regional exercise developed in this paper could be expanded using
different financial or institutional variables, since data availability is usually better for some countries than
for others. Other institutional quality indicators such as corruption indices, political regime measures and
cultural values proxies as well as other financial development variables, which tackle other dimensions of
financial systems, could offer more insights on the topic.
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Appendix
Table 1: Variable definition and sources
Variable Definition Coverage Source
Relative GDP Real GDP per capita in 1990 international US
dollars relative to United States (%).
Countries: 50 countries.
Years: 1970-2010.
Maddison Project
Database 2013
Liquid liabilities to GDP Liquid liabilities to GDP. Also known as broad
money or M3 (%).
Countries: lack of data
for Estonia, Puerto Rico
and Taiwan.
Years: 1970-2010.
Financial Development
and Structure Database
(World Bank)
Private credit to GDP Private credit by deposit money banks and
other financial institutions to GDP (%).
Countries: lack of data
for Puerto Rico and Tai-
wan.
Years: 1970-2010.
Financial Development
and Structure Database
(World Bank)
Legal System and Prop-
erty Rights
Composite index of the following indicators: ju-
dicial independence, impartial courts, protec-
tion of intellectual property, military interfer-
ence in rule of law and the political process, in-
tegrity of the legal system. It ranges from 0 to
100, with an increase corresponding to an im-
provement.
Countries: lack of data
for Belarus, Iraq, Libya,
and Puerto Rico.
Years: 1970-2010.
Economic Freedom of the
World (Fraser Institute)
Quality of Government Composite index that comprises the mean value
of three sub-indices: corruption, law and order,
and bureaucracy quality. It ranges from 0 to
100, with and increase corresponding to an im-
provement.
Countries: lack of data
for Macedonia, Mauri-
tius and Puerto Rico.
Years: 1984-2010.
International Country
Risk Guide (PRS Group)
Public debt to GDP Gross general government debt to GDP (%). Countries: lack of data
for Iraq and Puerto
Rico.
Years: 1970-2010.
Historical Public Debt
Database (IMF)
Patents Patent applications by residents, divided by
population between 15-64 (%).
Countries: lack of data
for Oman, Puerto Rico
and Taiwan.
Years: 1970-2010.
World Development Indi-
cators (World Bank)
Terms of trade Ratio between the index of export prices and the
index of import prices (Base year 2000=100).
Countries: lack of data
for Puerto Rico and Tai-
wan.
Years: 1970-2010.
World Bank / OECD
Tertiary education com-
pleted
Percentage of population older than 15 with ter-
tiary education as highest level completed (%).
Countries: lack of data
for Belarus, Macedonia,
Oman and Puerto Rico.
Years: 1970-2010.
Barro and Lee Edu-
cational Attainment
database
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Relative GDP 1865 32.288 15.715 3.474 100.765
Liquid liabilities to GDP 1309 49.024 34.578 4.060 313.624
Private credit to GDP 1320 44.016 35.907 1.119 237.580
Legal System and Property Rights 1347 56.905 14.170 11.467 90.937
Quality of Government 1095 57.414 16.076 11.111 94.444
Public debt to GDP 1434 45.087 31.821 0.551 289.554
Patents 1322 0.010 0.031 0 0.364
Terms of trade 1176 106.662 24.849 50.980 253.357
Tertiary education completed 1886 5.974 4.901 0.160 30.04
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Figure 1: Stability tests
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Figure 2: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Europe
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Europe
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Latin America
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure 5: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Latin America
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure 6: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Asia
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
36
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1937
Figure 7: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Asia
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure 8: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Africa and Middle East
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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Figure 9: Impulse-response functions (IRFs) for ten periods - Africa and Middle East
Note: The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 replications.
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